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Buchicchio: Newspapermen Must Disclose Sources

CHIPPING AWAY AT THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
NEWSPAPERMEN MUST DISCLOSE SOURCES
INTRODUCTION

T

HOMAS JEFFERSON WROTE,

"Were it left to me to decide whether we

should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without
a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."'
He understood that a free people are better off with no government
at all than with a government and no watchdog. Nor did he retract after
he had been abused as President by irresponsible newspapers. Jefferson
felt that all avenues of truth should remain open, and one of the most
effective means was freedom of the press. By forcing newsmen to
reveal their confidential sources, the Supreme Court has obstructed an
important intersection of this avenue.
This Comment will explore the background and history of the
case law and early constitutional
journalistic privilege in light of
argument. It will analyze the recent Supreme Court decisions denying
a privilege to newsmen to conceal their sources, and attempt to explain
how this privilege can best be maintained.

I. BACKGROUND
(a)

Common Law

The common law recognized only four relationships which gave
2
husband-wife, 3
rise to privileged communications: attorney-client,
6
5
4
informer-government and juror-juror. Two others, physician-patient
7
and clergyman-penitent,
have received almost universal statutory
implementation. Since this privilege is an exception to the general rule
which requires "disclosure of all information by witnesses in order that
justice may prevail," the tendency has been to restrict the scope of
existing privileges rather than to create new ones. Since every person
owes a duty to the community to give any testimony he is capable of, the
privileged communication has not met with widespread approval.

1 E. CHANNING, THOMAS JEFFERSON, PRESmENT 1743-1826 (1969).

2 Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891); Graver v. Schenley Products Co.,
26 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y.

1938).

3 People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1951).
4 Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
5 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
6 Edington v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 67 N.Y. 185 (1876).
7 Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
8 People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York City, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199 N.E.
415, 416 (1936).

[129]
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Although newsmen obtain much of their material from confidential
informants, they rely today at their own peril. For years newsmen in this
precarious position have attempted to sway the courts that a common law
privilege for newsmen to conceal confidential sources should be recognized. Their arguments have centered around grounds of public interest
in the flow of news and an analogy to traditional privileges, as discussed
above. No court has sustained the desired privilege at common law.9
The common theme of courts and commentators rejecting a common
law privileged relationship for newsmen is that it does not satisfy
Professor Wigmore's four fundamental conditions necessary for the
traditional establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
communication. The four criteria are:
1. The communication must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation. 10
These four criteria have caused considerable confusion in the
consideration of privilege statutes and of the constitutional argument.
Whether or not these conditions are obtained for a newsman depends
on an understanding of what interests need protection and how those
interests are affected in the absence of a privilege. The newsmen are not
claiming a privilege to conceal the basic information communicated to
them by the informant, but desire this privilege to conceal only the
identity of the source and nothing more. It is highly doubtful that a
person's identity-simply his name-fits the notion of "communication"
as it is advanced by Wigmore. Even if the informant's name is a
"communication," the four conditions justifying the privilege still exist:
(1) the name was communicated on the understanding it would not be
disclosed; (2) the relation, for public revelation of vital information
which the informant will not disclose unless he can be guaranteed
anonymity, requires the confidentiality; (3) the community has a strong
interest in fostering the relationship because of its concern for the
wide dissemination of news; (4) the injury to the relation and consequent
dissemination of news outweighs, in many circumstances, the interest
in disposal of litigation.

9 Brewster v. Boston Herald Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.C. Mass. 1957).
10 8 J. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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Although these arguments have been rejected, newsmen have achieved
some success in obtaining their privilege through various state statutes.
(b)

Privilege by Statute

At the present time, 23 states have enacted statutes" which appear
to create a right of newsmen not to divulge confidential sources of
information. A typical statute is that of New Jersey which reads:
[A] person engaged on, connected with, or employed by, a
newspaper has a privilege to refuse to disclose the source, author,
means, agency or person from or through whom any information
published in such newspaper
was procured, obtained, supplied,
12
furnished or delivered.
These statutes create a statutory right to reveal the contents of a
communication without being required to reveal the name of its auhor.
The statutes do not expressly permit such employees to refuse to testify
as to information confidentially received. There are but a few cases
13
interpreting these statutes. In a Pennsylvania decision, In re Taylor,
which involved the refusal by the editor of The Philadelphia Bulletin
to obey a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to bring records of
confidential interviews held with a city official whose activities were being
investigated by a grand jury for possible wrong doing, the court found that
the words "source of information" in the Pennsylvania statute embrace
documents as well as the identity of the parties. In its opinion, the court
viewed the purpose of the statute with favor and held it should be
liberally construed.
A contrary view was taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Although not faced with the same issues presented in Taylor, the New
Jersey court in State v. Donovan14 held that the statute should be
strictly construed. From this negative posture, it would appear that the
New Jersey courts will resist any extension of the coverage of the statute
beyond its plain words. Therefore, it is doubtful that the New Jersey
statute as presently worded will be interpreted as protecting information
confidentially received as well as the source of such information.
tit. 7 § 370 (1970); ALASKA STAT. § 9.25.150 (1971);
ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1972-73); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964);
CAL. Evm. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); KY.
REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 45:1451-54 (Cum. Supp. 1972);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 35 § 2 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1954), M.C.L.A.
§ 767.5a; MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-2 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. §
48.087 (1970); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A, 84A-21 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970);
" ALA. CODE RECOMPILED

Omo REv. CODE § 2739.04-.12 (Page Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 330
(Supp.1973).
12N.J. REy. STAT. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970).

13 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).

14 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943).
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Although the scope of these modern statutes is yet undefined, the
decisions interpreting them serve to reiterate the prevailing common law
rule that a newspaperman must answer pertinent questions and disclose
sources of information when called to testify. It is the statute alone which
permits a newsman to remain silent in the face of judicial interrogation.
Until such time as state courts undertake the actual interpretation of the
question, the potential breadth of these statutes will remain a matter
of pure conjecture.

II. IN THE BALANCE
(a)

Duty to Disclose Testimony

A basic rule of our judicial system is that witnesses properly
summoned before a court must give their testimony unless there exists
a special privilege or exemption. 15
Wigmore summarized the history of this principle and states the
current approach as follows:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public has a right to every man's
evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption,
we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty
to give testimony that one is capable of giving, and that any
exceptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional .... 16
It appears a court can easily reach a fair consideration of the issues
through compulsory testimony. The Supreme Court has emphasized
the importance of compelling testimony. 17 It has been held that the
power extends to grand juries and to the taking of depositions.' 8 The
power has also been held applicable to legislatures. 19
When a person refused to testify in any of these situations, he
could be brought by the party seeking information before the court or
legislature, ordered to testify, and be found guilty of contempt and jailed
if he refused. It is clear, then, that the power of courts to compel
a witness to answer questions and to cite him for contempt if he refuses,
does not violate the witness' constitutional right of freedom of speech.
15 8 WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2190-92.
16 Id. at § 2192.
17 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919):
[1It is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance upon
court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every person
within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon being
properly summoned, and for performance of which he is entitled to no further
compensation than that which the statutes provide. The personal sacrifice
involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare
of the public.
See also, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
18E.g., Shillitoni v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) and cases cited therein.
19 E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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But it is doubtful that a litigant in a civil action has a constitutional
20
right to compulsory testimony of witnesses.
A defendant in a criminal action has explicit guarantees under the
sixth amendment. 21 In situations not covered under the sixth amendment,
however, it may be that there is no constitutional authority of litigants
and courts to compel testimony but rather the power is an English
22
common law principle adopted by the American judicial system. The
duty to testify and the power to compel testimony are not absolute, but
courts are reluctant to find exceptions.
(b)

Free Press-News Gathering

22
The constitutional argument has been that the first amendment is
on
restrictions
broad enough to protect the dissemination of news against
interest
competing
the
outweighs
protection
this
news gathering, and that
in compulsory testimony. While there are no extensive records of what
was meant by the phrase "freedom of the press," the Supreme Court has
made it clear that first amendment guarantees are to give broader24
century.
protection than what was available in England in the late 18th
of
protection
amendment
first
the
that
repeatedly
The Court has claimed
freedom of speech and of the press is to be given broad and sweeping
coverages, 25 and it has invalidated attempts to qualify the coverage while
26
finding a variety of restraints to be unconstitutional.

The reason which the Court most often expresses for a broad reading
of the first amendment is that public discussion and debate of issues, and
27
free society.
criticism and investigation of public bodies are essential to a

2

oSee generally 61 MICH. L. REV. 184, 185 n. 5 (1962).

21 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have com-

pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
the sixth amendment applies to the states, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
22 See WioMoRE, supra note 10, at § 2192.
23 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom.. . of the press....
24
See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-65 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-6
(1936); Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS, 10, 42-44 (1955); 6 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 1790-1802, 387-91 (1906).
25 E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Bridges v. California.
314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
2
6E.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) -(contempt citaTon); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (City nuisance ordinance).
27 "The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in government affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally
informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences ..." Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
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The first amendment, however, is not absolute, and if there are strong
policy reasons for restrictions, protection is subject to compromise. 28
There is no indication in writings of the times that the framers and
supporters of the Bill of Rights intended "freedom of the press" to
include news gathering. Clearly, the first amendment covers more than
direct restraints on publication. 29
The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is essential "not to limit
the protection of the right to any particular way of abridging it."30
Morover, the exclusion of news gathering from first amendment coverage
is unresponsive to the policy of the amendment. Forced disclosure of
certain relationships may interfere with the exercise of first amendment
liberties as effectively as direct governmental rstraints against such
exercise. 31 If newspapers are restrained in gathering news, obviously they
cannot print the news which they were prevented from gathering. 32
Nevertheless, the courts in Torre and Goodlader doubted whether
freedom of the press covered news gathering. 33 However, both hypothesized that the first amendment did apply and, thus, were forced to reach
their conclusions through a subsequent superficial weighing of interests.
Subsequent to Torre and Goodfader, the Supreme Court in Lamont
v. Postmaster General held that the first amendment does protect the
right to receive information.3 4 Acting pursuant to a federal statute, Post
Office officials established a system whereby, whenever a local post office
received for final delivery an item of "communist political propaganda," it
would hold the item and send a notice to the addressee. If he desired to
receive the item, the addressee simply had to send in a request. All
requests were honored and no lists of those desiring the propaganda were
kept. According to the Post Office, the sole purpose of the system was to
prevent propaganda from being delivered to those persons who did not
want to receive it. The Supreme Court held that the statute as interpreted
and applied in such a system was unconstitutional. In a concurring

28 Libel and obscenity are not protected by the first amendment. Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
29 E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). It protects distribution and
circulation of what is published. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
30 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936), citing Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
31 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
3
2Although restraint is not the purpose but rather a secondary effect of the denial of
the privilege, the operative effect is restraint on news. The restraint need not be direct
to be abridgement under the Constitution. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
33 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir. 1958); In re Goodfaders, 45 Hawaii
317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
34 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan was more explicit and agreed that, "[The
first amendment 'necessarily protects the right to receive [information].' ",5
Of course some restraint on news gathering is necessary, reasonable
and constitutional. For example, courts can bar newsmen along with the
37
general public from the courtroom. 36 In Estes v. Texas, the Supreme
Court held that the trial court should have barred television from
courtroom proceedings. The Court did not say that news gathering is
outside the scope of the first amendment coverage, but rather that
overriding interests may justify limitations on news gathering.
On the other hand, the popular analogy between barring reporters
from courtrooms to assure fair trials and compelling them to disclose
sources to assure fair trial is inappropriate. In the case of restriction of
news gathering during a trial, the harm done by gathering is immediate. If
information is gathered and published, the trial is upset by extraneous
factors which may influence the court and jury. Judicial process has been
impaired and an individual litigant may have been injured. But in the
case of the confidential source, no immediate harm is caused by
the newsmen talking to informants and then publishing the information.
Indeed this activity may be in the social interest because the public is
38
better informed. A recent case, Seymour v. United States, recognized
this distinction. While upholding a contempt conviction of a photographer
who violated a standing court order prohibiting courtroom photographs,
the court assumed that where there was no interference with the judicial
process restrictions on news gathering would violate the first amendment.
To argue that there should be no privilege at a later trial or
other judicial or legislative proceeding ignores the fact that if the
reporter had been barred from his source there would have been no
potential testimony anyway.
Analysis of the Supreme Court's application of the first amendment
to other situations reinforces the argument that there should have been at
least by analogy a qualified protection for newsmen to conceal confidential
sources. In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,39 the Supreme Court held that a state
statute requiring the N.A.A.C.P. to reveal its members-in this case to
file membership lists with the state attorney general-violates rights
of freedom of speech and assembly made applicable to the states under
the 14th amendment. The Court reasoned that forced disclosure of

35d. at 308; quoting dictum from Mortin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143

(1943).
36 United Press Ass'n v. Valenti, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E. 2d 777 (1954).
37Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
3
8 Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
39N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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members might discourage persons from exercising the right to associate.
Similarly, requiring newsmen to reveal sources would discourage sources
from transmitting news and consequently would inhibit the free flow of
news to the public in violation of the first amendment protection. 4°
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama is distinguishable, however, on two points. First,
the Court there accepted the notion that the N.A.A.C.P. was not asserting
rights of its own, but rather rights of the individual members and potential
members whose identities it sought to conceal. Analogously, the newsmen
situation doesn't assert that the informants have a constitutional right to
have heir identities concealed; rather the policy concern is the public
4
interest in the flow of news. Nevertheless, espcially in light of Lamont, 1
th Supreme Court could easily have found acceptable a newspaper's or
newspaperman's standing to assert the rights of its individual readers
and potential readers to have access to information. This position would
reflect the notion reiterated in Time, Inc. v. Hill where the Supreme
Court upheld a news magazine's, not a reader's, assertion of freedom of
the press, stating that, "those [constitutional] guarantees are not for the
benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us."
Second, in the N.A.A.C.P. case, the Court rejected as weak and
insufficient the state's justification that it wanted to determine whether or
not the organization was engaged in interstate commerce in violation
of the state corporation statute. The Court pointed out that compliance
with the request for names would not aid that determination. In some
circumstances, requiring the newsmen to divulge the name of the
informant would not further the underlying purpose of assisting courts,
grand juries or legislative committees in their determination.
In New York Times v. Sullivan" the Supreme Court noted that in
considering common law policies, it gave special weight to the first
amendment when public officials are concerned. In holding that persons
could be held responsible for libel of public officials only where erroneous
information was published "with actual malice," the Court displayed
a willingness where the first amendment is concerned to limit rights which
a litigant otherwise would have." The Supreme Court's extension of The
New York Times doctrine in Time, Inc., v. Hill" was and may still be

40259 F.2d 545, 549 (dictum), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources Under the First Amendment, 11 STAN. L. REV. 541-46
(1959).
41381 U.S. 301.
42
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
4
3New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4The case turned on the public officials nature of the libel, not on the fact that a
newspaper was involved.
4 385 U.S. 374, 389.
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one of the strongest arguments for recognition of the newsman's privilege.
In that case Life Magazine published an article which intended to and
did give the erroneous impression that a fictional play, "The Desperate
Hours," mirrored the experience of the Hill family when they were held
hostage in their suburban home by three escaped convicts. In the play, the
father and son are beaten and the daughter is subjected to verbal sexual
insults, but in fact, these events did not occur. Hill sued the magazine for
invasion of privacy and, on appeal, the Supreme Court held for the
defendant magazine. In setting the standard that a newspaper could be
liable for invasion of privacy through error or in a story only where the
error was made with "knowledge of reckless falsity," the Court noted:
We create grave risks of serious impairment of the indispenable
service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with
the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated
in the news article with a person's name,46 picture or portrait,
particularly as related to non-defense matter.
Thus in Time, Inc., the family suffered injury to its reputation but
was denied recovery in a civil suit because of the danger to the free flow
of news. Analogously, the injury to a litigant in a civil action caused by
this inability to force a newsman to identify his confidential source could
be justified by the superior interest in the dissemination of news.
Although the Supreme Court and lower courts have considered the
issue of governmental informers to be an evidentiary question and not
a constitutional one under the first amendment, the policies regarding
government informers and newsmen informants are parallel. Wigmore
emphatically recognizes government informers, concluding that "its
' 47
He observes that disclosures from
soundness cannot be questioned.
identities are disclosed, for
informer's
if
discouraged
are
informers
they, then would be subject to great risks and that "law enforcement
to furnish them with
agencies often depended on professional informers
48
activities."
criminal
about
a flow of information
49
privilege. It
The Supreme Court has also realized the need for such
has been noted that "public policy forbids disclosure of an informant's
50
and that "the purpose of the
identity unless essential to the defense,"
privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in
51
effective law enforcement." The same analysis fits the newspaperman's

48355

U.S. at 389.

47iWOMORE, supra
48 Id.

note 10, at § 2374.

49McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-312 (1967); Rovairo v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (dictum).
5o Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
51 Rovairo v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
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privilege. Disclosures from informants would be discouraged if their
identities are revealed. The purpose of the newsman's privilege should be
the furtherance and protection of the public interest in the free flow
of news. Therefore public policy could also forbid disclosure of an
informant's identity unless essential to the defense. The analogy is even
more powerful when the source has uncovered public misdoings. In that
case, the newsman's privilege could further not only the public's right
to know, but also its concern in exposure of public wrongdoing and in
effective law enforcement. It is through the press that crimes of public
officials which otherwise might go undisclosed are revealed.

III. EVALUATION AND REJECTION OF FIRST
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE FOR NEWSMEN
(a) As discussed previously, since reporters met with so little success
in asserting a common law privilege, newsmen in recent cases have maintained that the right to conceal their sources is constitutionally guaranteed.
In 1958, Judy Garland brought a civil action against the Columbia
Broadcasting System for breach of contract and for defamation. 52 In
pre-trial discovery proceedings, Miss Garland sought the name of the
CBS "network executive" whose allegedly defamatory statements had
been published in Marie Torre's gossip column in the New York Herald
Tribune. Miss Torre refused to answer deposition questions seeking the
name of her source, and when she subsequently disobeyed a federal
district court order to reveal the name, she was found in contempt of
court.13 An appeal to the Court of Appeals of the second circuit
4
Mr. Justice (then Judge) Stewart, presiding at Garland v. TorreM
as the
Circuit Justice, accepted the hypothesis that "compulsory disclosure of a
journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgement
of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of
news." 55 But, pointing out that the first amendment is not absolute and
that "the fair administration of justice" underlies the well-established
policy that witnesses shall testify. Stewart held that where the identity
of her source went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim, "The Constitution
conferred no right to refuse to answer. ' 56 The Supreme Court denied

52259 F.2d 545.

Miss Torre argued three grounds to justify her refusal to testify: (1) Freedom of
press; (2) Federal public policy; (3) Trial court discretion to limit the scope
of pre-trial discovery under Federal Rule 30.
54 259 F.2d 545.
55 Id. at 548.
51d. at 558.
53
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certiorari and Miss Torre served 10 days in jail. She was not called again by
57
Miss Garland, although the process could have been repeated endlessly.
In 1961 the Supreme Court again refused to review a case directly
raising the issue of the newsmen's privilege. In a disbarment proceeding,
the Supreme Court of Colorado sought to prove that in filing a petition
with defamatory statements about a former chief justice of the Court, the
accused attorney was motivated by a malicious purpose to achieve
publicity for himself. The court wanted to know whether the attorney
had given a copy to a reporter before filing petition, but the reporter
in question refused to disclose whether the attorney was her source. The
court held her in contempt and sentenced her to 30 days' imprisonment.
As it turned out, the information apparently was not essential because
58
the attorney was disbarred on other grounds.
In that same year, the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a news
photographer's assertion of a constitutional privilege. The party seeking
the source's name was the plaintiff in a suit for reinstatement as a member
of the Honolulu Civil Service Commission on the ground that her ouster
at a meeting of the commission had been illegal and arbitrary. In
deposition proceedings a news photographer admitted attending the
ouster meeting, having received information from a confidential source
that an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff was being contemplated. The
photographer disobeyed an eventual court order to give the name of his
source and was held in contempt of court. In contrast to Torre, the
information here related to actions of public, not private, individuals and
the identity of the source did not go to the heart of the litigant's claim.
59
But in In re Goodfader's appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii nevertheless relied heavily on the Torre case and affirmed the contempt conviction.
In another case, as part of the grand jury probe of criminal conduct
and corruption by Philadelphia city officials, the district attorney sought
tape recordings, written statements, memoranda of interviews, and other
documents about an identified official which were held by the
Philadelphia Bulletin. The president and the general manager of
the paper refused to produce the documents citing a Pennsylvania statute
that "no [newsman] shall be required to disclose the source of any
information."' 60 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in favor of
the newsman by giving the statute a liberal reading to include the privilege
to withhold documents even when the source has been identified otherwise.
But the court brusquely denied the newsman's constitutional claim as

57Even though the CBS executive eventually revealed his identity, Miss Garland still

lost the suit.
58 Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
5945 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961)..
60 PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 28, § 330 (1930).
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devoid of merit. 6 ' More recently, the managing editor of the University
of Oregon's student newspaper wrote an article concerning the use of
marijuana by students at the university. She promised the students that
if they permitted her to interview them for publication, she would not
reveal their identity. Summoned before a grand jury, she refused to
divulge the names of the persons interviewed and quoted in the article.
Her first amendment plea was rejected in a 1968 decision by the
Oregon Supreme Court which upheld a lower court order finding her
guilty of contempt and fining her $300.62
The most recent decision which prior to reversal represented a
significant expansion of the concept of freedom of the press was Caldwell
v. United States.63 A comparison between this decision and the later
reversal proves elucidating. On February 2, 1970, a federal grand jury
investigating possible breaches of federal criminal law by the Black
Panther Party subpoenaed Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter
specializing in the reporting of news concerning the Black Panthers.
Caldwell was directed to appear and to bring notes and tape recordings of
interviews reflecting statements made for publication by officers and
spokesmen of the Black Panther Party. Caldwell protested the scope of
the subpoena and a second subpoena was served which included a
protective order, providing in general that the journalist could not be
required to reveal confidential associations and information developed
or received by him as a news gatherer (and in particular, information
given to him by members of the Black Panther Party), unless such
information had been given for public disclosure. It also offered Caldwell
the right to consult with his counsel at any time during the proceeding.
Despite the protective order, Caldwell refused to appear. His motion to
quash the subpoena was denied and he was directed to appear subject
to the protective order. In the meantime, the term of the old grand jury
expired and a new grand jury was sworn in. On May 22, 1970, a new
subpoena was served directing Caldwell's attendance and containing the
protective provision of the first subpoena. Caldwell disregarded this
subpoena as well, and for his failure to attend the grand jury proceeding
was held in contempt of court.
Caldwell contended, and his contentions were supported by several
amici curiae briefs, 64 that the privilege granted by the district court would
not suffice to protect the first amendment interest at stake. Caldwell
argued that the inevitable effect of the subpoenas will be to suppress vital
61

In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d (1963).
62 State v. Buchanan, 86 Ore. Ad. St. 81, 436 P.2d 729 (1968).

63 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
64 Among the participants in these briefs were counsel for several branches of the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and
Newswee.
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first amendment freedoms-by driving a wedge of distrust and silence
between the mass media and the militants and in the absence of compelling
65
governmental interest not shown here, his appearance before the grand
jury should not be required. The court noted the suspicion of outsiders
endemic to news sources like the Black Panther Party and the subtle
nature of the journalist-informer relation, especially the often surreptitious
manner by which the Panthers conduct their affairs. Thus, compelling
testimony of confidential information before grand juries would result in
an unbridgeable rift between the militant group and the press.
Moreover, pointing to the fragility of the relationship between the
militant group and the press, the court recognized that fear of betrayal is
compounded by a reporter's being called to testify behind closed doors
of a grand jury proceeding. The uncertainty engendered by such secret
proceedings could effectively render the journalist-Panther relationship
non-existent. Therefore, judicial process destructive of rights cannot be
used without the government's demonstrating a compelling need for
66
the witnesses' presence. In reaching its decision, the court utilized the
balancing test above. Repeatedly, the court spoke of the necessity
of balancing the rights at stake. For instance, after stating that first
side
amendment rights are in jeopardy, the court remarked, "On the other
67
of the balance is the scope of the grand jury investigative power."1
Soon thereafter the court noted that "the question posed was whether,
as a matter of law, the loss to grand jury ...outweighs the injury to first
68
amendment freedoms." In this case the court held first amendment rights
specific aspect of "freedom of the press" being
The
tipped the balance.
weighed is the public's right to know. It was apparent that the court was
not concerned with preserving Caldwell's relationship of trust with the
69
it was not worried about the "inevitable
Panther's for its own sake;
to
effect of the subpoenas ... suppress first amendment freedoms of
Mr. Caldwell, ' ' 70 rather, it was troubled by the prospect that the public
has a first amendment right to the potential news stories (which stories
could be lost by adherence to the subpoena) paramount to the right of
the grand jury to compel attendance and testimony. Basically, this
decision was in conformity with the line of "balancing" decisions

F.2d at 1084.
Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (1970).
67 434 F.2d at 1085.
68Id.
69 Id. at 1084.
TOld.
65434
66
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requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling and substantial
interest if essential freedoms are to be curtailed or inhibited.71
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the government, in Caldwell, had shown no compelling need for the testimony.n It
therefore determined that the applicant as the medium for preserving the
public's first amendment right, was entitled to a qualified privilege.
However, the qualified privilege
ephemeral privilege for newspapermen.
(b) Tipping Back the Balance.

granted was to be only an

In Branzburg v. Hayes,73 the Supreme Court considered on first
impression the claim that the first amendment affords newsmen a
privilege to refuse to reveal to a grand jury information gathered
from confidential sources.
In Branzburg, the Court held 5-4 in an opinion by Mr. Justice White
that "the consequential but uncertain, burden on news gathering" created
by compelling reporters to testify before a grand jury is outweighed by
the public interest in "fair and effective law enforcement, 7 4 a process
in which the reporter may obtain a protective order limiting a grand
jury investigation only when he can show that the grand jury is conducted
in "bad faith" or for the purpose of disrupting his relations with his
7
confidential law enforcement need. 5
The Court identified as the "heart of the claim" pressed by the
newsmen the view that the "burden on news gathering resulted from
compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any
public interest in obtaining the information." 76 The bulk of the opinion
accordingly marshalled a number of disparate arguments alternately
evaluating the two sets of interests being weighed: some minimized the
burden on the flow of news caused by grand jury subpoenas of newsmen;
others stressed the presence and importance of countervailing government
interests. The Court cited with approval past cases which suggested a first

71 DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislation Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
72 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).

73 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
74 Id. at 690.
75

Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall
which reached the opposite conclusion: That first amendment interests in newsgathering outweigh the government interest in law enforcement and thus the Constitution
should afford newsmen a qualified testimonial privilege before a grand jury. 408 U.S.
at 725. Justice Douglas filed a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that
newsmen were entitled to an unqualified privilege since the protection of the first
amendment is absolute. 408 U.S. at 711.
76 408 U.S. at 681.
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amendment right to receive information.77 The Court attempted to
characterize the empirical evidence that press subpoenas deterred sources
78s
and suggested
from confiding in newsmen as "speculative and divergent,
reasons why some informants might continue to divulge information to
reporters. The Court suggested three such reasons. Some informants may
expect that the reporter will not be called or that he will not be compelled
by the prosecution to testify if he objects. Others may be members of a
dissident group whose desire for public exposure could outweigh any fear
they may have that their confidences will be divulged to a grand jury. Still
other informants, who are not themselves implicated in crime but might
be fearful of reprisals by those whom their stories incriminate, may be
willing to rely on law enforcement officials to protect 79them, much as
police informers rely for protection upon the prosecutors.
It is also argued that the traditional absence of a newsman's privilege
80
had not historically dampened the free flow of news. On the government
arguments
preliminary
two
made
Court
the
balance,
the
of
side
interest
suggesting that a newsman's privilege would clash with "public policy." It
argued at some length that the common law and statutory history of the
8l
crime of misprison of felony demonstrated that "concealment of crime
82
and agreements to do so are not looked upon with favor. Second, it
argued that recognition of such a privilege would create a "private system
83
not subject to any control
of informers operated by the press"
comparable to that exercised by the courts and by elected law enforcement
officials over the system of police informers. But the Court's control
arguments on the government interest side concerned the interests served
by the grand jury and its power to compel testimony. The Court stressed
that the "investigation of crime by a grand jury implements a fundamental
governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of
the citizen." 84 The Court found that safety to be a "compelling"
government interest to which the practice of calling reporters to testify
85
bore a "substantial relation."
In the final portion of the opinion, the Court stressed directly the
major issue which divided it from Justices Stewart, Brennan and Marshall

77Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-390 (1969); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965).
78 408 U.S. at 693-4.
79 Id. at 694-95.
80 Id. at 698-99.
8
1See 18 U.S.C. §4 (1964).
82408 U.S. at 697.
83 Id. at 697-98.

84 id.at 700.
85 Id.at 700-01.
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who joined the dissent. This was the newsmen's claim of a qualified
privilege requiring the government to make special showings of need
before a grand jury could compel the testimony of any reporter who
invoked the first amendment privilege. The argument for the imposition
of such a requirement was based largely upon prior cases which required
the government to show that an interference with first amendment interest
was no broader than necessary to achieve permissible government ends.8
Justice Stewart, relying on these cases, concluded that before compelling
newsmen to testify, a court should require that the government make three
showings: First, "That there is probable cause to believe that the newsman
has information which is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law;" second, "That the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of first amendment rights;" third, the government has a "Compelling and overriding interest in the information."8 7
The majority rejected a qualified privilege for three reasons. First, it
reasoned that "[I]f newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they
are claimed to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge
determines the situation justifies it is hardly a solution to the problem."8
Only an absolute privilege would quell the fears of such sensitive sources.
Second, the Court argued that the administration of a qualified privilege
would present substantial practical and conceptual difficulties. Justice
White predicated that in the administration of only qualified newsmen's
privilege, the courts would have to define categories of newsmen so
qualified for the privilege-a procedure seemingly in conflict with the
traditional doctrine that freedom of press is enjoyed by all publishers
whatever their size or quality. Furthermore, he argued that administering
such a privilege would require distinguishing among different types of
crime to determine when a government interest was compelling.8 9 But the
most important consideration persuading the Court to refuse to require
preliminary showings of need was its view that the grand jury must be
free to make its own determination of its need for evidence. The Court
reasoned that to play its role as an instrument of law enforcement, the
grand jury had to have access to everyman's evidence; it had to be able
to proceed on the basis of clues, tips or rumors, and its examination of
witnesses could not be obstructed by requiring that a foundation for its
questions be laid whenever a newsman claimed that his access to
confidential sources would be jeopardized if he were compelled to testify. 90

86 See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
87 408 U.S. at 740.
88 Id. at 702.
89 Id. at 704-06.

90 d. at 701-02.
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At the end of the opinion, the Court noted that there were some
circumstances in which the court might inquire into a grand jury's reasons
that news
for calling a newsman to testify. Recalling its recognition
91
stated
Court
the
protection,
amendment
first
for
qualify
did
gathering
that when a grand jury investigation is "instituted or conducted other than
in good faith" or "in furtherance of official harassment of the press,
undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's
should issue limiting
relationship with his news sources," a judicial order
92
Branzburg opinion
The
testimony.
compel
to
jury
grand
the
to
power
thus indicated that in the future, newsmen will have some constitutional
protection against attempts to compel the disclosure of confidential
information to a grand jury. It is quite unclear, however, what the
scope of that protection will be. The "good faith" test as formulated
by Justice White seems minimally protective.
There may, however, have been two different versions of what the
good faith test means among the five Justices of the Branzburg majority,
and this discrepancy may have important consequences for the test's
application in the federal courts. Justice Powell, though he joined the
Court's opinion, filed a very brief concurring opinion in which he
reiterated the good faith test in a way that made it appear more liberal
than it seemed as stated by Justice White. To begin with, Justice Powell
appeared to interpret the test as not imposing any burdens of proof on
either newsmen or the government. "[T]he Court-when called upon to
protect a newsman from improper or prejudicial questioning-would be
free to balance the competing interest on their merits in the particular
case." 93 More importantly, Justice Powell seemed to expand the meaning
of the good faith standard. For him it meant that a newsman might
seek a motion to quash a protective order whenever he was "called
upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship
to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to
source relationships without
believe his testimony implicated confidential
' 94
a legitimate need of law enforcement."
This conception of when a newsman may obtain judicial protection
from a grand jury investigation seems distinctly broader than that of
the Court; surely there will be some facts which can be said to make
out a showing that requested information bears only a remote and tenuous
relationship to the subject of investigation, but that cannot be said to
demonstrate the bad faith of the grand jury. And the category
of circumstances where there might be "other reasons to believe" a source

91395 U.S. 367, 386-390; 394 U.S. 557, 564; 381 U.S. 301.
92 408

U.S. at 707-08.

93

Id. at 710, n. 4.

94

Id. at 710,

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 8

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:1

relationship needlessly implicated seems to be explicitly open-ended.
Unfortunately, Justice Powell made no attempt to clarify by reference
to
facts his abstract statements of conditions under which a newsman might
be privileged not to testify. Both Justice Powell and Justice White assumed
that the three cases before the Court raised no question of good faith: and
neither embellished his statement of the test with hypothetical examples.
It is far from certain that there will be a significant range of factual
settings in which Justice Powell might break with the rest of the
Branzburg majority and join the four dissenters.
Branzburg raises questions, however, as to whether a newsman's
privilege may be recognized in the context of other investigative
proceedings, particularly civil and criminal trials, and legislative committee
hearings. One argument militating against such recognition is that once
the court has held that a grand jury may compel a newsman to testify
about his confidential sources, there may be no further deterrent effect
on
the willingness of those sources to furnish information by compelling
testimony in civil and criminal suits or to legislative committees. This
argument may not be valid, however. Trials and legislative hearings,
unlike grand jury proceedings, are public. Persons who seek confidentiality
for reasons other than fear of prosecution might be deterred from confiding in newsmen if their testimony could be compelled in public hearings.
To be sure, in criminal trials this incremental burden on news
gathering may not outweigh strong countervailing government interests.
The government interest is greater where a newsman is called to testify
at
trial than where he is called before a grand jury, for in the criminal trial
the government's prosecutional interest is directly at stake. And
the
testimony that may be compelled will be limited by the relatively strict
standards of relevance which govern the admission of evidence at trial.
Moreover, if the newsman's testimony is sought by the defendant, then
the sixth amendment guarantee of compulsory process to all necessary
witnesses who will be involved becomes relevant.
Civil trials and legislative investigations may pose a closer question,
however. The incremental burden on news gathering attendant upon
compulsion of testimony in such a wide variety of public hearings might
not be justified by the needs of these particular proceedings because the
social interest in compelling testimony from newsmen in a civil trial is
arguably less than the interest in compelling testimony at a criminal trial,9

The Court has already indicated its willingness to deprive a civil
of recovery
in order to protect the first amendment interests in a free press. litigant
Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.Time,
254 (1964). In
addition, statutory privileges limit the availability of testimony at civil
trials, supra
note 11.
95
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and because the testimony of an individual is less likely to be essential to a
legislative investigation than to a trial or grand jury proceeding.as

WILL DENIAL OF PRIVILEGE HAVE AN EFFECT
ON FLOW OF NEWS?
Lack of privilege might inhibit the free flow of news by affecting:
willingness of the informant to seek out or to communicate with
The
(1)
the newsmen; (2) The willingness of the newsmen to seek out informants
and to transmit information received from informants for publication.
Surveys of the press indicate that a substantial number of newspaper
stories are based on information which could only be secured through
97
confidential informer-reporter relationships. Erwin Conham, Editor-inChief of the Christian Science Monitor, estimates that from 33 per cent
to 50 per cent of that newspaper's stories involve confidential sources, and
the Wall Street Journal states that 15 per cent of its articles are based on
98
information from confidential informants. The managing editor of the
San Francisco Chronicle writes that "An absolutely staggering number of
stories, political and non-political, arise from information received in
99
confidence." "Systematic" empirical evidence has not been developed, in
part because reporters and editors do not keep records of the confidential
nature of sources and therefore must make educated guesses as to the
incidence of confidentiality. But it is still clear from available data that
some leading newsmen regard confidentiality as essential for development
of many news stories. To argue that newsmen feel no pressure or restraint
in the present situation is to obscure the critical point. If the power to
enforce compulsory testimony is used to the full extent, there would be a
serious effect on the free flow of news. This potential power is vast and
can be intimidating. It is reporters who cover activity unfavorable or
embarrassing to authorities who seem likely to be hampered. For the
sources of this information are now vulnerable to identification and
subsequent punishment. It is impossible to measure how reluctant such
sources have become in the aftermath of the Supreme Court action. In a

98 See United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328, 331-32 (1st Cir. 1972), where Judge Caffina
to be crucial to
reasoned that detailed testimony by an individual is more likely

grand jury investigation than to legislative investigation since the purpose of the former
been
is to see if there is probable cause to believe that particular crimes have
committed by particular persons, while the object of the latter is to gather information
to resolve problems of a general nature.
97 For the most intensive survey to date, see appendix to Guest and Stanzler, The
REv.
Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.
18 (1969). Also in Caldwell. 18 affidavits by such prominent newsmen as Walter
Cronkite and Eric Sevareid were submitted with the Caldwell and amicus briefs
stressing the importance of informer-reporter relationships in gathering of news and
the necessity of guaranteeing confidentiality for the maintenance of these relationships.
98 Guest and Stanzler at 43-44,

99 Id.at 60,
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recent feature article, 00 many reporters including the famous muckraker,
Jack Anderson, have commented that sources he has been dealing with for
years have begun to ask cautious questions about the Caldwell case and
to seek renewed assurances he would protect them. Although relatively
few reporters have suffered from the crackdown, relatively few reporters
engage in serious investigative work. Must we wait for a "chipping away"
which will make the first amendment unrecognizable?

CONCLUSIONS
As articulated by the Supreme Court majority, the rule, as it now
stands, provides that newsmen must respond to relevant and material
questions asked during "good-faith" grand jury proceedings. Even though
it was a 5-4 decision with Justice Powell's understanding that the holding
is a limited one, and although the matter may be subject to future
modification upon the submission of cases presented, we cannot wait
for the Court to forge a case-by-case distinction through interpretation
of the "good-faith" test.
Congress now has before it two dozen bills dealing with the
newspaperman's privilege.'
Some of them would give the press an
"unqualified privilege," which is blanket exemption from
forced testimony
such as that which covers most doctor-patient relationships. Realizing that
news reporting like any other profession is comprised of both strong and
weak people, this author does not feel an absolute privilege is proper.
Suppose a fictitious story could, under absolute privilege, be defended on
the ground that its sources cannot be revealed. But in fact there may be
no sources. Also, in a criminal trial an exception to absolutism is justified
because the source has been linked with some specificity to alleged
criminal acts. For this reason a middle-of-the-road approach seems most
equitable. This bill should provide unqualified immunity from coerced
disclosure before grand juries, legislative committees or government
agencies, but a limited immunity before open courts trying major criminal
cases. The easiest way to sculpt the dimensions of the privilege may be
definitional: Who is a newsman? When is the privileged relationship
created? Under what conditions is the informant protected?
The bill which this author prefers is a bill sponsored by Senator
Lowell Weicker of Connecticut. 102 It would apply only to federal
proceedings but could provide example for state legislative action. The
Weicker Bill would bar any federal grand jury, agency, or committee of

10 See, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972 (Magazine), at 78.
101 S. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
102 d.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss1/8

20

Buchicchio: Newspapermen Must Disclose Sources

Fall, 1973l

NEWSPAPERMEN MUST DISCLOSE SOURCES

Congress from compelling disclosure of sources by bona fide newsmen, as
defined in the Bill. On the other hand, in a federal court if the action was
pending in a case of murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, kidnaping,
airline hijacking or breach of national security statute, disclosure of
sources could be ordered by the judge if it could be shown that the source
was of "substantial and direct" relevance to the fair determination of the
case and if it could be demonstrated that the source was not reasonably
available in any other manner. While the Weicker Bill primarily protects
the identity of sources, it is not absolute.
However, one thing is absolute. Congress must act soon before the
best way to inform people in a democracy is silenced!
MICHAEL F. Bucmccmo

* Ed. Note: Recently six more states have enacted protective statutes. They are:
Nebraska, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Tennessee. See note
11, supra.
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